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4 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operational experience has been used for many years to improve 
the safety of nuclear facilities throughout the world.  
 
In the European Union, to support EU activities on evaluation of NPP operational events, a 
centralised regional ‘Clearinghouse’ on NPP operational experience feedback (OEF) was 
established in 2008 at the JRC-IE, at the request of the nuclear safety authorities of several 
Member States. Its purpose is to improve communication and information sharing on OEF, 
and to promote regional collaboration on analyses of operational experience and 
dissemination of the lessons learned. 
 
One of the technical tasks of the European Clearinghouse is to perform in-depth analysis of 
families of events (‘topical studies’) in order to identify the main recurring causes, contributing 
factors and lessons learned, and to disseminate and promote recommendations to reduce 
the recurrence of similar events in the future.  
 
This topical report has been prepared by the centralised office of the European 
Clearinghouse on OEF and focuses on experience from events related to construction and 
commissioning of Nuclear Power Plants.  
 
Interest in constructing new nuclear power plants is increasing worldwide. Some countries 
are embarking on a nuclear programme for the first time, while others have decided to re-
start construction of nuclear power plants after a hiatus of decades. According to the Power 
Reactor Information System (PRIS) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
currently 55 construction projects have been launched or are being considered worldwide.  
Starting new build is very demanding, as much of the earlier experience and resources have 
progressively been lost from the nuclear industry. Circumstances are quite different from 
1970s when most of the plants currently operating were constructed. Vendors had large 
experienced organisations ready to go ahead, and had less need to rely on subcontractors. 
In addition, there was no shortage of skilled manufacturing capacity in the market, and 
designs were often based on work done in similar ongoing or completed projects. 
 
Consequently, lessons learned from the past construction periods or from the ongoing 
construction projects are very important for the increased number of utilities and regulators 
involved in building new NPPs. They will help to reduce the recurrence of past construction or 
commissioning problems. 
 
This Topical Study covers construction, commissioning and manufacturing events originating 
prior to the start of the commercial operation, in order to highlight lessons learned and 
recommendations for current and future construction programmes. 
 
The construction stage includes the construction of the buildings and the initial installation 
of components.  
 
The manufacturing stage includes both on-site and off-site manufacturing. 
 
However, it must be stressed that operating plant modifications and design 
deficiencies are beyond the scope of the study.  
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2 METHODOLOGY 
 
The three main sources of information that have been used for this report are: 
- the Incident Reporting System (IRS) database,  
- the database of the Working Group on Regulation for New Reactors (WGRNR), 
- the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) of the US NRC. 
 
The IRS is an international system jointly operated by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA). 
For this study, 1090 events were screened and 247 are applicable. 
 
The WGRNR (a working group of OECD/NEA) has developed a new database for 
construction experience feedback to allow WGRNR members to share worldwide 
construction inspection findings. In December 2009, 100 event reports were available to the 
WGRNR members.  
After screening these reports, 26 WGRNR events were identified as applicable for this 
report, of which 7 overlap with the IRS database or with other WGRNR reports. 
 
US commercial nuclear reactor licensees are required to report certain events under US NRC 
regulation 10CFR50.73. These reports, called ‘Licensee event reports’ (LER), are available to 
the public on the NRC’s website [1]. 
After screening the NRC website, which contains LERs from 1980 onwards, 309 LERs were 
considered applicable. 
 
The events identified were classified in three categories for the purpose of this report, with 
definitions based on the IAEA glossary [2]: 
- Construction: ‘The process of (…) assembling the components of a facility, the 
carrying out of civil works, the installation of components and equipment (…)’, prior to 
the start of commercial operation 
- Commissioning: ‘The process by means of which systems and components of facilities 
and activities, having been constructed, are made operational and verified to be in 
accordance with the design and to have met the required performance criteria’ 
- Manufacturing of components and equipment which were installed in the plant prior to 
the start of commercial operation  
 
Each of these categories is further classified according to the type of component concerned: 
pipe, valve, weld, civil work (for example buildings structure, anchorages, supports), electrical 
components, I&C, etc. 
 
This structure enabled to make recommendations both for each different pre-operational 
stages and for each type of component. Moreover, it enables us to identify more generic 
recommendations than a classification into systems depending on the reactor design. 
 
After this classification, each category and sub-category was screened to show the lessons 
learned for a given component at a given stage of construction. In addition, general 
recommendations were identified. The overall process is described in the figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1 — Structure of the study 
 
 
3 MAIN TRENDS OF THE IRS DATABASE 
 
In addition to the analysis of the individual event reports from the IRS, the LERs and the 
WGRNR databases, a trend analysis of the IRS database has been performed leading to the 
main conclusions hereunder. 
 
1) The items which are the most affected by construction, manufacturing or commissioning 
deviations are I&C (19%), electrical components (17%), welds (14%), valves (10%) and pipes 
(9%). 
 
2) The average detection time of the initial defect is about 8 years after the start of 
commercial operation and this time depends on the components involved (see figure 2) 
 
3) The proportion of common cause failures can be quite high for some materials: more than 
50 % for civil work and fire protection, 45 % for electrical components (the average is 34 %) 
(See figure 2) 
 
4) More than 75 % of the events are found fortuitously, and the rate of fortuitous detection is 
particularly high for some items: civil work, electrical components, I&C, pipes and valves. 
 
5) Some items such as civil work (buildings structure, anchorages, supports) and electrical 
components exhibit all three: a long detection time, a high rate of common cause failure and 
a high rate of fortuitous detection. 
 
These conclusions emphasise the need to minimise the number of deficiencies during 
construction, manufacturing and commissioning of a new reactor, as they can be major 
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latent failures for a long time and can have actual consequences for safety after the reactors 
start to operate. More information about latent failures can be found in [3]. 
 
This also emphasises the necessity of detecting the deficiencies at the construction stage, as 
it may be difficult to identify them during operation. 
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Figure 2 — Common Cause Failure (CCF) ratio and detection time 
 
 
4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As explained above, this study allowed to raise about 50 concrete lessons learned for several 
types of components (electrical components, valves, pipes…) and about 30 more general 
recommendations which are valuable for any kind of component. 
The lessons learned are listed in Appendix and the recommendations are given hereunder. 
These recommendations as well as the lessons learnt are fully described in the study report. 
 
Safety culture 
 
Adherence to nuclear safety principles should be the top priority already at the construction 
and manufacturing stages. 
 
The safety culture and safety awareness of the personnel involved in the pre-operational 
stages should be ensured through appropriate training, highlighting the role and the safety 
significance of the components concerned. Every person participating in the project needs to 
understand the safety significance of his / her work, to promote personal responsibility.  
This is necessary for all the staff involved in the process, including the manufacturer’s staff, 
the vendor’s staff, contractors and sub-contractors, the staff in charge of the surveillance of 
the activities, and the staff in charge of the acceptance of the components. 
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This safety awareness should be ensured not only for ‘complicated’ works like welding but 
even for ‘more simple’ tasks like anchoring or cable sheathing, especially since some sub-
contractors may not have any experience of working for the nuclear industry. 
 
Quality assurance and quality control scope 
 
Handling, packaging, transportation and storage conditions of safety-significant components 
should be covered by and monitored through a Quality Assurance Programme.  
 
Management of non-conformances 
 
The requirements for handling non-conformances should be clearly identified. These 
requirements should define non-conformance and specify the roles and responsibilities of the 
licensee, the vendor and the subcontractor for reporting and correcting non-conformances, 
and the regulatory approval process. 
Compliance with these requirements should be checked by the licensee and the regulator. 
 
Communication 
 
Special attention should be paid to communication between the different companies and/or 
entities involved in building a plant. This communication should be conducted through pre-
defined and documented procedures, and submitted to a Quality Control Programme. 
Moreover, this communication should enable information about the safety significance of 
components or equipment to be transferred from the design stage to the contractors and their 
sub-contractors in charge of installing the components or equipment.  
 
Task interfaces 
 
The interfaces between different tasks should be clearly identified and managed in such a 
way that the departments or companies in charge of these tasks are aware of the precise 
scope of their work, and that works at the interface between two tasks are not omitted.  
 
Change management 
 
Any changes from the design, installation or manufacturing procedures should be properly 
documented and assessed. 
 
Third-party quality control 
 
Oversight and quality control of ongoing works should be provided by an organisation which 
is competent and experienced in the works, clearly identified as responsible for quality 
control, and independent of the organisation in charge of the works. 
 
Foreign Material Exclusion 
 
A full FME programme should be implemented as soon as construction starts and not just 
during operation. 
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Temporary devices 
 
Temporary devices used at the manufacturing, construction and commissioning stages 
should be properly documented in order to ensure that all the temporary devices are 
removed after their use. 
 
Specific nuclear requirements 
 
Every call for tender about safety-related components should include and emphasise the 
specific nuclear requirements and local nuclear regulations particularly as regards quality 
management and safety culture. Compliance with those requirements should be properly 
checked at the stage of awarding contracts and until the work is fully implemented.  
 
Housekeeping and Cleanliness 
 
Cleaning activities should be submitted to the same quality process as other safety-related 
activities, and commissioning tests should be performed after the cleaning activities. 
 
Handling devices 
 
Handling devices should be included in the scope of the quality controls as well as in the 
commissioning tests, which should be performed prior to the lifting of loads. 
 
Impact on nearby NPP units in operation 
 
The potential consequences of construction works on the safety of operating units should be 
assessed (Risk Analysis). In particular, the consequences of potential contamination from a 
construction site for operating units should be assessed and if needed, the contamination 
should be monitored. All other potential risks should be assessed (digging, excavation, 
spurious fall of cranes, use of explosives, etc.).   
 
Labelling 
 
The labelling of components should be in place as soon as the components are installed. 
 
Torque 
 
The applied torque should be submitted to independent verification during the relevant 
sequence of assembly operations. 
 
Welding 
 
Special attention should be paid to quality control of welding and the control sampling rate 
should take account of the safety-significance of the welds and the welding technique. 
Welding should be carried out by appropriately trained and experienced welders and the 
supervision of the welding activities should be performed by trained and experienced staff. 
 
Wiring 
 
Wiring checks should follow any cabling installations — they should be part of the installation 
procedure or programme and should be verified by the regulator. 
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Fire 
 
Special attention should be paid to the risk of fire during construction and commissioning, as 
the fire protection may not be fully installed at those stages and as construction works can 
generate dirt and heat. 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Special attention should be paid to the purchasing of commercial-grade components for 
safety-related equipment by the equipment manufacturer. The purchased parts should be 
properly documented and controlled by the manufacturer.  
 
Technological expertise should be proven and verified by the licensee, not only through final 
acceptance tests but also by checking that proven state-of-the-art technology is used.  
An augmented regulatory approach and inspections should verify that new manufacturing 
techniques and new types of equipment meet the specifications set by the designer. 
 
Time of the commissioning tests 
 
The functionality of any standby component which is normally not in operation must be 
regularly tested, as a long period of inactivity and the construction of other equipment during 
this period could alter the test results. 
 
Scope of the commissioning tests 
 
Tests conditions 
 
The safety systems should be tested in conditions that simulate real accident conditions, and 
if that is not possible, specific arrangements should be made for the systems concerned in 
terms of acceptance tests, quality assurance, etc. 
 
Comprehensiveness of tests 
 
The scope of the tests should include all the components and devices that are used during 
normal operation and those which could be used under accident conditions, including passive 
components such as pipes, as they may be clogged, and including manufactured 
components, with correct documentation, as the quality control at the manufacturing plant 
may be deficient. 
 
The automatic start-up of systems after a power disruption should be tested during 
commissioning. 
 
Fragmented tests 
 
Safety systems should be submitted to overall functional tests as far as possible, to ensure 
not only the performance of each single component but the performance of the whole 
system, including the interactions between different components. 
 
Non-actuation tests 
 
The tests should be designed to detect an unexpected (spurious) actuation of a safety 
system.  
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Commissioning of different units. 
 
The commissioning tests should be repeated with the same scope at all units, because each 
unit is unique at least from the installation point of view. 
 
Simultaneous tests 
 
The commissioning tests should be designed to take account of the fact that simultaneous 
tests may have an influence on each other’s results. 
 
 
Documentation of the commissioning tests 
 
The acceptance or commissioning tests should not be designed to check the installation 
drawings, which may be wrong, but should refer to the original design drawings. 
 
Commissioning tests acceptance criteria 
 
The test acceptance criteria should allow testers to verify not only the functionality of a 
system or component but also its level of performance. 
 
Systems reconfiguration after commissioning tests 
 
The proper reconfiguration of the systems after the commissioning tests should be checked. 
 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
About 247 IRS reports, 26 WGRNR reports and 309 US-LERs were reviewed and distributed 
into categories related to technical items or components: civil structures, electrical 
components, mechanical components, etc. 
 
A trend analysis of the IRS reports emphasises the need to minimise the number of 
deficiencies during construction, manufacturing and commissioning of a new reactor, as they 
can be major latent failures for a long time and can have actual consequences for safety 
after the reactors start to operate. 
 
The qualitative evaluation of these events has allowed us to summarise specific lessons 
learned and to make generic recommendations. These recommendations relate for instance 
to the management of non-conformances, to communication, quality control and quality 
assurance, to the safety culture and to specific items related to construction, manufacturing 
and commissioning. Our analysis has shown that most of the generic recommendations 
relate to the management of the construction project (specific nuclear requirements, 
communication, task interfaces, safety culture) and the management of quality (management 
of non-conformances, change management, third-party quality control, management of 
temporary devices). This report shows that consequently special attention should be paid to 
these organisational issues in addition to the attention paid to the purely technical tasks. The 
licensee management’s commitment to the quality system is a prerequisite.  
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This study shows that it is possible to extract lessons learned and recommendations for 
construction from operational experience. 
 
Despite the value of these recommendations, it must be stressed that many more 
recommendations could have been made if more detailed information about construction had 
been available, as detailed as in some WGRNR reports. Indeed, the event reports do not 
always include information about non-conformances detected and corrected prior to plant 
operation, as they have no impact on the safety of the operating plant during the reported 
event.  
Moreover, in most of the event reports resulting from construction deficiencies, the lessons 
learned for current and future construction projects were often not fully considered; instead 
they focused more on the corrective action required for the operating plant in question.  
 
Therefore, it could be very valuable to share construction experience in a systematic and 
timely manner at international level, especially as more than 50 new reactors are currently 
being constructed or considered worldwide. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
CCF   Common Mode Failure 
EQ   Environmental Qualification 
HELB   High Energy Line Break 
I&C   Instrumentation and Control 
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
IRS   Incident Reporting System 
LER   Licensee Event Report 
NEA   Nuclear Energy Agency 
NPP   Nuclear Power Plant 
OEF   Operating Experience Feedback 
QA   Quality assurance 
QC   Quality control 
SG   Steam Generator 
US NRC  United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
WGRNR  Working Group on the Regulation of New Reactors (NEA) 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF LESSONS LEARNED 
 
TOPIC LESSONS LEARNED 
Anchoring It must be ensured that the specified tools are used (for 
example, drill bits and drilling machine). 
As the anchoring devices are at the interface between 
systems and structures, so there must be sufficient 
cooperation between the departments for systems and the 
construction departments in the planning and control 
phase. This applies to the licensee as well as the technical 
supervisor organisation and the authority. 
Battery Batteries should be checked for damage before installing 
them on site. 
During manufacturing, special attention should be paid to 
the absence of impurities during welding of the plates and 
to the preparation of the resin used for sealing. 
Breakers The manufacturer’s documentation should specify the 
adjustment of the breaker’s draw-out unit and this 
adjustment should be checked. 
Special attention should be paid to the following items: 
– The alignment of the linkage of the trip devices 
– The use of proper material 
– The removal of the temporary latches 
– The cleanliness of the parts 
 
Special attention should be paid to the proper installation of 
the seismic positioners of the breakers.  
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Building structures The humidity and the lubricant inside the channelling 
device of the pre-stressing cables should be monitored 
during construction. 
The minimum thickness of lubricant on the external wire 
layers following manufacture of containment pre-stressing 
system cables should be precisely specified. 
A procedure should be developed to restore the lubricant 
on external wire layers after assembly of containment pre-
stressing system cables at NPP units, in order to prevent 
metal corrosion in the cable wires during operation of the 
containment pre-stressing system. 
The size of concrete sections of the basemat could have an 
influence on the appearance of cracks. 
Special attention should be paid that concrete block walls 
and masonry walls are constructed with regard to the 
seismic response of the walls and potential damage to any 
safety-related equipment in the vicinity.  
Concrete pouring should be validated by mock-up for 
locations where access may be difficult for concrete 
consolidation (high density of steel reinforcement, etc.) 
Cable A comprehensive cable condition monitoring programme 
should be implemented in the construction stage. The 
cable sheathing of the safety-significant systems should be 
checked after installation where it is accessible, more 
especially at the bends and at the electrical connection. 
During construction, inspection should be performed in the 
cable trays before there are closed. 
The cable fire rating should be checked and the cable route 
should be verified to ensure the separation of trains and 
units 
An individual and specific procedure should be written for 
installation of multiple cables in a single penetration, in 
order to avoid damage during installation. The installation 
of designed separations in the penetrations should be 
checked. 
During manufacturing, special attention should be paid to 
the following points: 
– homogenous blending of additives in the PVC sheathing 
– eccentric positioning of the conductor in relation to the 
protective sheath. 
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Electrical connections The installation procedures should be written, and the 
quality controls should be performed, so as to ensure the 
right type of connection, proper fastening and avoidance of 
damage during the connection activities. For that reason, 
the connections should not be covered by insulation until 
checked.  
Attention should be paid to connections between two 
different types of cables and conductors. 
Special attention should be paid to the crimping of the 
conductors during manufacture and installation of the 
electrical panels to ensure the connection quality, and to 
the quality of the connection lugs. Stamping, in particular, 
should not impair the mechanical properties of the lugs.  
During installation, the size of the connection lugs should 
be monitored in order to ensure a good connection with the 
conductors. 
Special attention should be paid to the Environmental 
Qualification of supplied conduits or junction boxes, and 
more especially to the electrical splices. In addition to 
document review, inspection should be performed at the 
manufacturing stage when the inspection itself does not 
test the EQ. 
Specific attention should be paid to the openings of the 
junction boxes which allow drainage of the accumulated 
water inside the boxes during some accidents. 
 
Emergency Diesel 
Generators 
Special attention should be paid to the alignment of the off-
gas compensators. 
High-voltage bushings The condition of stored bushings should be checked 
periodically and the power factor of stored bushings should 
be checked before putting them in service. 
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I&C The I&C modules’ overvoltage protection should be tested. 
The probe installation should be closely monitored during 
construction and appropriate commissioning tests should 
be prepared and carried out to detect any defect in every 
single component of a measuring channel. 
The initial calibration of measurement transmitters should 
be checked against vendor documentation. 
Closure of the valve motor contactors at the minimum 
expected voltage for design basis conditions should be 
tested. 
Control software with known or suspected faults should not 
be used as this may have unexpected influences on other 
software. 
The clearance of the reed switch contacts should be 
checked during manufacturing. 
The minimum distance allowing functional redundancy 
should be ensured between redundant impulse lines. 
 
Metallic liner When liners are welded on the construction site, care 
should be taken that the welding environment is compliant 
with the construction code. 
It is also proposed that maximum allowed sizes of 
containment liner bulge should be determined through a 
risk-informed approach, to help decide when corrective 
action is needed. 
Other mechanical 
components 
Cranes should be included in the commissioning 
programmes and the tests and verifications should be done 
prior to the main load lift. 
 
Penetrations and building 
seals 
Every single penetration and building seal should be 
properly documented (location, role, design) to ensure 
proper follow-up during further plant operation. 
The initial design of inter-building seals should take into 
consideration the need to be able to conduct checks on the 
quality of installation at the construction stage and 
subsequently. To do so, the seals should be accessible 
over their entire length and close to floor for ease of repair. 
When a penetration seal functions as both a fire barrier and 
a flood barrier, it is important for licensees to consider both 
functions in the design, installation, inspection, and 
maintenance. This includes accounting for static head 
pressure to ensure watertight seals do not get dislodged. 
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Pipes The pipes should be exhaustively inspected during 
construction. 
The grain size should be specified for hot-formed austenitic 
tube bends.  
Special attention should be paid to the proper installation of 
pipe supports and restraints intended to mitigate the 
consequences of earthquakes or HELB. 
The installed pipe insulation weight should be verified to 
comply with the seismic specifications for pipe supports. 
Measures should be taken to avoid clogging pipes with 
construction debris and other foreign materials. A FME + 
cleanliness / housekeeping policy should be implemented 
from the very beginning of the project. 
Rigorous management of temporary devices should be 
implemented, to avoid leaving temporary blind flanges, 
orifices, etc. inside the pipes after commissioning of the 
plant. 
Pumps The visual ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ markings on the 
pumps’ oil inspection glass should be checked. 
The dimensions of the internal parts should be checked 
during the acceptance inspection.  
 
SG Pre-service inspections of the SG should be carried out 
after the flushing of the SG. 
Special attention should be paid to the tube expansion 
process and to cleanliness during manufacturing and 
assembly of the SG in order to avoid stress corrosion 
cracking. 
Tube acceptance inspections should also be performed at 
the SG manufacturing site and any quality deviation should 
be known by the pre-service inspection staff on the NPP 
site, in order to facilitate reviewing of inspection data. 
The location of the SG tube supports should be checked. 
The path of the SG tubes through the corresponding holes 
in the tube sheets should be checked. 
 
Switches The installation instructions for switches should specify if 
stop screws have to be installed and the mechanical stops 
of the switches should be checked during start-up tests. 
Transformer insulators Attention should be paid to the shelf life of the insulators 
prior to installation. 
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Transformer windings The presence of the transformer winding supports should 
be checked in order to avoid winding deformation in the 
event of high current. 
Valves Special attention should be paid to the proper installation of 
drains in the safety valves’ actuator boxes.  
Ventilation Flow balance and differential pressure measurements 
should be conducted on the control room ventilation 
systems in order to detect potential deficiencies. 
Special attention should be paid to the proper installation of 
the buildings’ overpressure protection devices (blow-out 
panels or tornado venting panels). 
Weld All welds should be inspectable at the construction stage. 
The original welding documents and inspection results 
should be carefully kept as they are needed for further in-
service inspections. 
Extra attention should be paid to bi-metallic welding, and 
more specifically to the border between buttering and base 
material. 
Care should be taken that the welding environment (on the 
construction site) allows compliance with the construction 
code.  
Events related to welds show the very high importance of 
appropriate weld QA, QC & inspection programmes. 
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